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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rule was a good one."5 Whether or not this is the North Carolina
court's position, there is good argument for the court making ex-
press exceptions to protect legal rights now often nullified by cross-
ing state boundaries. As suggested, the exception would be a very
narrow one and apply only to residents injured in automobiles
driven by a resident while in transit from and intended to return
to the state of residence. This approach would allow the court to
alleviate inequities and effect clear policies while awaiting a suitable
alternative, if the court desires an alternative, to lex loci delicti. Such
an approach would preserve predictability and consistency in North
Carolina conflicts law.
PHrILIP G. CARSON
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-The "Mere Evidence"
Rule-Applicability to the States
The mere evidence rule of Gouled v. United States,1 that it is a
violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure to take evidence from a defendant's premises
unless that evidence is contraband, stolen property, or an instru-
mentality of a crime, was declared by the United States Supreme
Court in 1921. Courts have found it difficult to apply the instru-
mentality exception, and the theory of the rule has been harshly
criticized.2 After the decision in Mapp v. Ohio,3 which requires
that evidence taken in violation of the fourth amendment be excluded
in state trials, the question was certain to arise whether Gouled
should be applied to the states.
"0 N.H. at - , 222 A.2d at 207.
1255 U.S. 298 (1921).
'MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 5.04 (1957); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2184a, 2264 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'Although the mere evidence rule rests primarily on the fourth amend-
ment, the peculiar origin of the rule in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), gave rise to a theory that the rule rests on a dual basis of the
fourth and fifth amendments. Boyd did not involve a search at all, but a
court order to produce incriminating documents. In invalidating the order
the United States Supreme Court first announced that a search for mere
evidence was prohibited by the fourth amendment. Next the order was de-
clared invalid under the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion. Although a dissent insisted that the fifth amendment alone was the
correct basis for the decision, a third justification for the holding was added:
[Vol. 45
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In Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary5 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals became the first federal court to consider this ques-
tion. In Hayden the police entered a house in hot pursuit of an
armed robber and found Hayden undressed in bed. During an other-
wise lawful search of the house the police seized a cap found under
a mattress and a jacket and trousers found in a washing machine.
This clothing was admitted in evidence at the state trial as proof
that Hayden was the man seen running from the scene of the rob-
bery. In federal habeas corpus proceedings Hayden objected to the
admission of the clothing in evidence on the grounds that it was
mere evidence. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and
holding that the Gouled rule applies to the states, ordered a new
trial.6
The United States Supreme Court has set no standard for de-
termining how close the relationship between the evidence and the
crime must be before that evidence can fairly be termed an instru-
mentality.7 In Marron v. United States' the Court indicated that
the exception should be broadly construed in favor of the prosecu-
tion when it held that receipts and utility bills seized in a raid were
instrumentalities of a prohibition violation because they were part
the order was equated with a search and the opinion concluded that any
search for mere evidence was prohibited by the joint operation of the fifth
and fourth amendments. The theory that one of the functions of the fourth
amendment is to prevent self-incrimination fails to account for the fact that
once the safeguards of oath, specificity, and particularity are met, the fourth
amendment allows the use of force to exact evidence from a suspect's
premises. If followed to a logical conclusion, the fifth amendment would
allow no search whatsoever, or would at least protect the suspect from
seizure of the most damaging evidence. But the effect of the rule is just the
opposite. Because of the exceptions for contraband, stolen property, and
instrumentalities, only the least incriminating evidence is protected. See
State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965); Comment, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 355, 360-64 (1966); Comment, A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U.
CHi. L. Rtv. 319, 324-27 (1953), Comment, 31 YALE. L.J. 518, 522 (1922).
For some time after the decision in Mapp it was thought that the states
would not be faced with the mere evidence rule because Mapp applies only
the fourth amendment to the states. The fifth amendment was applied to the
states as well in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See Shellow, The
Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Ride: The Search for and Seizure of
Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. Rtv. 172, 180, (1964).
363 F.2d 647 (1966).
'Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25.2 (Supp. 1965) a search warrant may
issue for anything "which may constitute evidence of a felony ... " The
holding in Hayden invalidates this portion of the statute.
'Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Ride and The Reason, 54 GEo. L.J.
593, 614 (1966).
275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
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of the outfit used by operators of a speakeasy. But five years later
the Court favored a narrow construction in United States v. Lef-
kowitze when similar items were held to be mere evidence. The
court attempted to distinguish the cases by saying that the search in
Lefkowitz was more extensive and exploratory,1" but as far as the
nature of the evidence is concerned, the cases cannot be reconciled.1'
Due to this lack of a standard the lower federal courts have found
it difficult to apply the rule evenly and many inconsistencies have
resulted. For example, in United States v. Lerner"2 an address book
was held to be mere evidence. But in Matthews v. Correa3 a similar
address book was held to be an instrumentality. 4
The property theory that is used to support the Gouled rule has
been harshly criticized. 5 The basic idea of the rule is that property
of the defendant may not be seized. Stolen property may be seized
because it does not belong to the defendant. Contraband may be
taken because the defendant's property rights in it have been voided
by statute.' To justify seizure of instrumentalities the courts resort
to the ancient deodand principle that things used in the commission
of a crime are forfeited to the state.' To justify this property
theory it is sometimes said that stolen property may be seized be-
cause the law wishes to return it to the owner and that contraband
° 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
'ld. at 465.
" LASSoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 135-36 (1937).
"2 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
"S 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943).
" As to documentary items conzpare United States v. Loft on Sixth
Floor of Bldg., 182 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (letters offering obscene
materials for sale were mere evidence) and Takahashi v. United States, 143
F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944) (letter containing evidence of criminal fraud held
inadmissible) and Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933)
(documents ordered returned after search) with United States v. Klaw, 227
F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (advertising circular for obscene materials
held to be instrumentality) and Landon v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d
285 (2d Cir. 1936) (invoice used in smuggling operation was instrumental-
ity) and Sayers v. United States, 2 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1924) (where busi-
ness records were held to be instrumentalities). As to non-documentary
items compare Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(handkerchief with evidence of sex crime not instrumentality) with United
States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (1958) (shoes worn in bank robbery were
instrumentalities).
"' Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 474, 478 (1961).
1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
17 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
(Vol. 45
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is confiscated to prevent further use.' The forfeiture of instru-
mentalities cannot be so easily explained. Some instrumentalities
such as weapons should be taken to prevent further use in crime or
to protect the searching officers from attack. 9 But other instru-
mentalities such as a cancelled check, that cannot be used in crime
again and are certainly not dangerous, may be seized as well."°
Critics consider this property theory archaic and arbitrary. They
argue that the primary purpose of search is to secure evidence2 ' and
that the police should not be hindered by ancient notions of forfei-
ture. The protection given to mere evidence is arbitrary because it
defeats the policy of making evidence available to the police without
balancing any comparable interest of the defendant against that
policy.2
2
In defense of the rule it is said that it protects privacy by pre-
venting an exploratory search or fishing expedition among the papers
and effects of a suspect.23 Learned Hand provided the most famous
statement of this idea in United States v. Poller,2 4 "it is only fair
to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is
the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in
rummaging about his personal effects to secure evidence against
him... limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the
guest itself." Critics argue, however, that in practice the rule does
not protect privacy. During a search for contraband, stolen property
or instrumentalities the police must typically go through a suspects's
18 United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 98 (1962).
19 Palmer v. United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
0Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1940).
21 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 239 (1960). This is the
attitude of the North Carolina Supreme Court. See State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 601, 148 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1966) (dictum). But see Church v.
State, 151 Fla. 24, 31, 9 So. 2d 164, 167 (1942).2 Comment, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 355, 360 (1966).
"Proponents of the rule also argue that it is required by the history of
the fourth amendment. Citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029,
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1785), the English landmark case prohibiting the
general warrant, they conclude that the first clause of the fourth amend-
ment includes a prohibition against a search for mere evidence. Fraenkel,
Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. lRv. 361, 366 (1921);
Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L. REv. 257-77 (1925). Later critics insist,
however, that the fourth amendment must be read as a whole as a safeguard
against general search and that no ban on seeking evidence per se is included
in the prohibition against unreasonable search. Kamisar, The Wiretapping-
Eavedropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 891, 914
(1960). Comment, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 355, 363-67 (1966).
"United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (1930).
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papers and effects as thoroughly as they would if they were per-
mitted to search for all relevant evidence.2" If the police are going to
find the evidence in any event, they should be allowed to use it."
Since Mapp, defendants have urged acceptance of the rule in the
state courts with increasing frequency, but the states have found the
rule undesirable 7 The California Supreme Court28 has challenged
the rule saying that although the United States Supreme Court has
paid lip service to it, it has in fact been abrogated and cannot be
considered a constitutional standard that should apply to the states
under Mapp.- It is suggested that the rule, if it is to be retained at
all, should be reduced to an expression of the Supreme Court's
power to supervise the federal courts.3° Other state courts have not
"Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 477 (1961). But see Ramsey, Acquisition of Evi-
dence by Search and Seizure, 47 Mica. L. Rnv. 1137, 1155 (1930).
' The test of reasonableness under the circumstances offers protection
from excessively extensive searches. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S.
346 (1957); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Although the
test of reasonableness applies to persons, the mere evidence rule does not.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) where police were allowed
to take a blood test over the objection of a suspected drunk driver. In Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1913) (dictum) it was said that the
state has always had the right "to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime." If
the type of evidence is immaterial in the search of a person, it would seem
that any type of evidence should be available in the search of a dwelling.
', State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1966) ; Eisentrager v. State,
79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963); People v. Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1963). Contra, Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127
S.E.2d 406 (1962).
People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1966).
.' The California Supreme Court in People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780,
782, 408 P.2d 108, 110 (1966) relies on Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34
(1963) where it was said, "The States are not ... precluded from demands
of effective law enforcement in the States, provided that those rules do not
violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. . . ." Thus the United States Supreme Court has indicated willing-
ness to reinterpret older decisions which might be onerous to the states.
The holding of Ker, that state police do not have to give the traditional
knock and notice on the door of a dwelling place before beginning a search
if giving notice will result in immediate danger that persons inside will
destroy evidence, was not, however, a concession of the same magnitude
that a re-evaluation of the mere evidence rule would be. There is only one
United States Supreme Court case on the knock and notice requirement and
it is based on a statute rather than the Constitution. Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301 (1958). The mere evidence rule has been directly applied
three times by the United States Supreme Court in Boyd, Goided, and
Lefkowitz to suppress evidence and it is well represented in dicta. See e.g.,
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64 (1950).
" The Gouled rule has been incorporated into FED. R. Climn. P. 41(e).
[Vol. 45
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been so direct but have attempted to avoid application of the rule
through broad construction of the instrumentality exception. For
example, in State v. Chinn3 ' the Oregon Supreme Court recently
held that bed linen, a camera, and film showing a photograph of the
prosecutrix in the defendant's bedroom were instrumentalities of
the crime of statutory rape.
In Hayden the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected
both these approaches. Although the court shows little enthusiasm
for the rule it concludes that the holdings and dicta of the United
States Supreme Court require application of the rule to the states."2
The court also serves notice that it intends to enforce the rule
strictly in favor of the defendant and will resist "stretching to the
point of distortion the category of 'instrumentality of crime,' in
order to achieve the admission in evidence of articles manifestly of
evidential value only." 33
It would nevertheless seem that practical difficulties from appli-
cation of the rule in the states will outweigh its benefits. Although
the rule does make a search somewhat less onerous for a suspect, 34
especially where papers are involved, 35 it has been suggested that
1231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962). See also Elder v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304, 318 (Dist. Ct App. 1966), but see Cagle v.
State, 147 Tex. Crim. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928 (1944).
82 363 F.2d at 651.
" There is room for doubt that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals will
adhere to this narrow construction. A dissent in Hayden, 363 F.2d at 655,
that the clothing should be considered instrumentalities of the crime of
armed robbery because it was hidden in an attempt to perfect escape, is one
of the most extreme applications of the rule that has been suggested in the
federal reports. See United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1962),
where the court gave the instrumentality exception an extremely broad con-
struction in holding that receipts on which a prostitute recorded the amounts
received from customers were instrumentalities of a Mann Act violation.
" Hand was apparently motivated by this consideration in Poller. See
note 24 supra and accompanying text. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 479 has
suggested that this "pro tanto" protection of a suspect would be "just as well
served by a restriction on search to the even-numbered days of the month."
" The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting that all United States Supreme
Court cases applying the mere evidence rule to suppress evidence involved
papers, has suggested that papers, and not effects, should be protected by
the rule. State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965). Under this
view papers deserve more protection than effects because of their thought
content and closer relationship to privacy. Searches of papers can also be
extensive. Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Wis. 1960)., At
times the mere evidence rule may be helpful in preventing excessive seizure
of papers on the grounds that they throw light on the suspect's operations,
but it would seem that this is a question of relevancy on which other and
more appropriate rules are available. See United States v. Antonelli Fire-
works Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
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the state police are faced with a greater variety of situations than
federal officers were evidence such as that in Hayden is necessary
for a conviction."' It is further urged that if confessions are often
to be denied the state police and greater emphasis on scientific in-
vestigation is desirable, the police in the states should be allowed
maximum access to evidence in an otherwise lawful search."
HENRY C. McFADYEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Illegal Search and Seizure-Injunction
Dissatisfied with the more common remedies for unlawful police
searches, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Lankford v. Gelston,1 has added significant dimensions to the use
of the federal injunction. The case arises from the efforts of Balti-
more police to apprehend two Negroes suspected of killing a city
policeman. Possessing arrest warrants, but no search warrants, the
police entered more than three hundred homes within a period of
nineteen days. The searches, largely based on anonymous tips, were
conducted predominately in Negro neighborhoods. Plaintiffs, own-
ers of the homes searched, sought a temporary restraining order in
the federal district court against further searches. Jurisdiction was
based on section 1983 of the Judicial Code.2 Since the searches had
ceased and the police commissioner had issued a general order 3 pro-
hibiting further searches without probable cause, the court refused
relief.4
The court of appeals, however, was unimpressed with the gen-
eral order, primarily because it left determination of probable cause'
'
8 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319, 327-32 (1962); Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of
Search and Seizure, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 150 (1962).
" Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647, 658 (1966).
'364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress."
Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
' For a full text of the order see 240 F. Supp. at 555 n.2 (1965).
'Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1965).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
